

CHAPTER 4:

DE TRINITATE (2):

UT CONVERTATUR AD DOMINUM

There are two overarching reasons for Augustine's stress on self-relation in his discussion of the Trinity. It eludes all talk of divine emanation, as proposed by Plotinus, and therefore preserves the doctrine of free creation *ex nihilo* while calling forth a quite distinct teaching about contemplation and the joy it brings.¹ And it frustrates any sort of subordination, such as one finds in the various inflections of Arianism from Arius (256-336) in Alexandria to Eunomius (*d.* 393) in and around Constantinople and to Ulfila (*c.* 311-83) in Hungary.² Yet placing a primary accent on self-relation runs a very considerable danger: as Augustine uses it, at least for long stretches, it makes self-love one of the first things he says of the deity and it is easy to think that in doing so he leaves God's overwhelming love for his creatures in the background. "God is love" (1 John 4: 9), as Augustine knows full well, and we understand God's self-love only when we recognize that the divine love is a simple substance (or essence) as well as mutual relations, internal and external. So divine self-love is grounded in deep and abiding love. Yet when Augustine proposes to think of the *imago trinitatis* as a dark mirror in our minds of the divine life, he emphasizes self-love once again, and this time there are legitimate concerns about his way of proceeding. Augustine gives us no reason to think of the love we bear as an essence, and there seems to be no compelling cause to say we love our love of neighbor when we can more reasonably say that we are satisfied or content with our love if it is our own. (Augustine's phrasing, remember, is *amare amorem suum*.) Insofar as the love we receive is divine, freely given to us as a prompt to love the neighbor, we should be thankful to God. To love uncreated love is one thing; to love created love is another.³

I have been following the motif of self-love, among other things, because I wish to remain with Augustine through all the steep ascents and switchbacks on his long trail of thinking about the Trinity in whose image we have been made, and yet all the while I have been looking from side to side to note his emphases and to see if there are any other tracks he could have taken. That Augustine honors God as love, as nothing other than love, is clear. I have been waiting for a clear draft of the *imago*, though, in which love of others (ἀγάπη), God and neighbor, is more readily apparent, that is, in which love of neighbor is not simply a duty to which we are commanded to perform but an act of love that becomes second nature when the *imago dei* is transformed by our inclining to the Lord. We would expect to find this insistence when Augustine pauses to consider the Holy Spirit, even though we have been made fully aware that, for him, each person of the Trinity is profoundly involved in the life of the other persons. Yet little is said about the Holy Spirit, except by way of his procession in the last book of the treatise. Appropriation, the doctrine by which we conventionally associate divine attributes with individual trinitarian persons, is broached in book six of *De trinitate* and quietly put to use in books seven and fifteen, but it is never elaborated as a theme.⁴ Although Augustine does not have to hand Scotus's distinction that the divine persons' properties are formally distinct from the divine essence, he knows very well that God is above and beyond all discursive thought and that there is no real distribution of attributes among the divine persons.

The questions with which I concluded the last chapter were these: how well can the mind know itself and love itself? What is the effect of Augustine's stress on self-relation? That the first of these questions was raised in the ancient world we can have no doubt. The Oracle at Delphi declared γνῶθι σεαυτόν, which in Latin is *Cognosce te ipsum* ("Know thyself"). Cicero had rephrased Apollo's words so that *Nosce te*, as he prefers to state it, is oriented more surely inwards, *Nosce animum tuum* ("Know your soul").⁵ Augustine would certainly have been

familiar with this passage, and in his *Soliloquia* he said, as we have seen in the second chapter, *Deum et animam scire cupio* (“I desire to know God and the soul”). Both the injunction and the desire are directed to the future, as personal projects to be undertaken, each one commending us to gaze into the imperfect mirror of self and thereby to learn something valuable about ourselves. Yet the Trinity, if it is marked in the human mind, must always and already abide there as image in one mode or another. It is one thing to have the *imago dei* in its fallen state, quite another to animate it so that it shines again so God can recognize himself and his creature there. And it will not shine, Augustine thinks, unless it is first subject to rigorous self-examination. *De trinitate* is an exercise in such rigor. Whatever else it is, it is a restless probing of Augustine’s own mind in order to discern the image of God there more clearly, an act which finally reflects upon itself and judges how the element of unlike predominates over the element of like in the image of God.

Of course, we might wonder if there are significant limits to first-person introspection revealing the mind as it truly is, and in doing this we are doing no more in our own ways than was done in the ancient world.⁶ We moderns may have the Freudian unconscious as part of “a whole climate of opinion,” as well as a number of sub-climates identified by his disciples and apostates, which makes us wary about making high claims to lucid self-knowledge undertaken by introspection, but if the ancients could not benefit from time spent lying on an analyst’s couch they could rely on logic.⁷ So can we: the question “Can the ‘I’ as subject reliably locate the ‘me’ as object?” has long been a familiar one in contemporary philosophy of mind, and answers to it in the analytic school tend to be skeptical ones.⁸ In quite another spirit, phenomenologists will tell us that there are passive syntheses in the mind of which the “I” remains quite unaware.⁹ In general, one may well be immune to error in some cases, as with identifying one’s own pain, while prone to make mistakes in other areas, not least of all in specifying relations between

mental states. Can the contents of one's mind always be accurately determined in tranquil reflection rather than in action? I might think as I sit in my armchair that I know my mind on a moral issue (I am quite sure that I give alms, for example) but when faced with acting on a particular occasion, even many of them, I might have to acknowledge that my acts diverge from the sense of myself as given in my reflections.¹⁰

We might also wonder what happens when the mind loves itself, as Augustine insists it does. To begin with, we might wish to know if there are different sorts of love or grades of love, and, if so, which is appropriate to self-love. Augustine seems to think that when I look into my mind I do so by way of an evaluative self-perception. To what is it directed? I might love aesthetic aspects of my thought — elegance, grace, lightness, swiftness, and so on — or prudential aspects of my mind such as its readiness to avoid anxiety or its ability to defend itself if it faces threats from outside (stern criticism, for example) or even from within (horrid memories, say, or terrifying nightmares). Must the mind love only its moral values?¹¹ The question grows barbs once one asks oneself if one loves all of one's mind in its moral aspect, including its *arrière-pensées*, its scruples, its mixed motivations, its subtle evasions, and its bad cognitive habits? Can it make mistakes from time to time or even all the time about what it truly loves about itself, even after it has been cleansed from attachment to sin? Does it not at times love itself perversely?¹² And can there really be healthy self-love without love for others? Even before we introduce the unconscious into our reflections, questions of this sort might make a modern reader circumspect about the version of the *imago dei* proposed in book nine, and that long before subscribing, even tacitly, to a Cartesian sense of the mind as *res cogitans*.¹³ Whether such reservations are sufficient to disable the *imago* as analogous to the Holy Trinity is another thing. Analogy is a loose-fitting robe.

Augustine will return, in book ten, to the problem of self-knowledge and respond to the sort of worry I have raised, and I will return with him when I reach that book.¹⁴ One general reason why he is not likely to be bothered by the sort of objections I have just raised is his firm belief that a self-relation allows the mind immediately to grasp itself. Another is an equally strong belief that what we know is directly before the mind's eye; it has more reality, so to speak, than a physical thing, and therefore we can trust what we "see" in the mind once the mind has been purified. Of particular interest here, although Augustine does not develop the idea at this point, is the *verbum mentis*, the mental word that he thinks precedes any actual word in a natural language as it is framed in the mind.¹⁵ Like *Ratio* in the *Soliloquia*, it abides on the borderland of the soul, being inside us and being sent to us by God. Once objectively "seen" or "heard" in the mind, with the help of divine illumination, it silently confirms the truth of something before it is articulated in language.¹⁶ Just as God gives birth to an eternal Λόγος that is the Truth, so (with God's Grace) we generate a *verbum mentis* in our minds that gives us a lively sense that a state of affairs is true.¹⁷ Later, in book fifteen, Augustine harkens back to the *verbum mentis*, pointing out more surely that it is the mysterious image of the Son in our minds: like Christ, the *verbum mentis* precedes all natural and conventional signs and is knowledge as reliable as we are likely to have in this life outside the study of geometry.¹⁸ No good work begins without this word, if it is a true one, being uttered deep within; and if it is true one will say, "Yes, yes" (15.3.20, alluding to Matt. 5:37).

This silent word is born, as it were, by an act of cognition oriented to *memoria*, which passively contains an image of what is set before one: the thought-act animates the image and its vividness is compelling.¹⁹ We might see it as a forerunner of what came to be called a "concept" in a sense that hovers between two modern ways of understanding that word, namely, an abstract object and a mental representation.²⁰ I say "between" because Augustine, no

Aristotelian in this respect, makes no use of abstraction as a philosophical procedure, nor does he regard the *verbum mentis* as merely subjective.²¹ At any rate, he has no concern, as Freudians and post-Freudians have, that the nature of the mind poses difficulties of a kind that would limit the powers of self-reflection.²² The *verbum mentis* is, as he says, an enigma; but that is only to be expected if we are looking in a mirror and seeing only our minds, as it were, and their trinitarian structure and not the Holy Trinity itself. But its enigmatic nature is entirely different from the opacity of the mind that comes from materialist accounts of the mind. These are largely derived from Stoicism, and Augustine must reject them in order to show that the self-possession of the mind can lead to self-knowledge.²³

In book ten Augustine continues his attention to the *imago dei* as given in *mens*, and he refines his account once more. The image will be given, he proposes, by way of *memoria*, *intelligentia* and *voluntas*, each of which is regarded as substance, each of which is equal to the others, and all of which make a whole (10.4.18). In turn, this trinity will be revised to *memoria sui*, *intelligentia sui*, and *voluntas sui*. Why these changes? Because, first, he takes the second triad to be largely drained of temporality and therefore perhaps closer to God's original image than any temporal triad could be. And because, second, while *mens* can be said absolutely of the Father, *notitia sui* and *amor sui* can be said only relatively of the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively. Before he gets to this position, however, Augustine feels compelled to recur to the examination of love, *amor*. There can be no way in which love appropriately serves at the level of *curiositas*; it must be in the mode of *studiositas*. For our love is not solicited by something wholly unknown but by something familiar to us, even if only partly or vaguely. Thus, "when we love a good man whose face we have not seen, we love him out of a knowledge of the virtues which we know in truth itself [*ex notitia virtutum amamus, quas novimus in ipsa veritate*]" (10.1.1).²⁴ (We might translate *novimus* here as "we recognize" so that, following the phrasing of

the English, we might retain as a shadow translation “a recognition of the virtues.”) The point is closer to what I proposed in the previous chapter than to what Augustine says with respect to God, namely that when we love without direct experience, we usually do so on the ground of reliable testimony rather than firm knowledge of the sort to which we recur after rationalism and the huge success of modern natural science and its deep investment in the language of pure mathematics. And this love should be characterized by humility.²⁵

One might object that we do not really love anyone we have not met, although we might respect or esteem a man or a woman whom we have been told is good. Augustine is speaking in the register of Christian ethics, however: we are specifically commanded to love one another (John 13: 34). Even so, we might ask ourselves if we do not love the man in question by dint of our compassion for him in the challenges he has faced and still faces in life, in his needs and limitations, whether internal or imposed on him, and not solely because of his virtues. If not, it becomes difficult to know what it would mean to love the man even though he is a sinner, just as we are. We encounter the man, or even hear about him, at a particular time, and we know that his life has preceded our awareness of him and that we know little or nothing of this life before it crossed ours. We know, to be sure, that we must give him medicine, food, drink, shelter and defend him from harm.²⁶ But we cannot contain all of him — his past heartaches, loves and sufferings as well as his aspirations and fears for the future, for instance — in an appraising, cognitive gaze, not even one that is centered on virtue, and, if we think we do, we are probably prizing what we know of him rather than loving him in the manner exemplified and commended in the Gospel.

As it happens, Augustine is quite content to admit that we do not need to know the whole of something, in detail and in each and every way, in order to know it as a whole. When the mind “knows some of itself,” he writes, “which only the whole of it can do, it knows its

whole self" [*Cum itaque aliquid de se scit, quod nisi tota non potest, totam se scit*] (10.2.6). There is no question, then, of the mind knowing all its content, all its evasions and motivations, and everything to which it directs itself; in order to know itself, it needs to know itself only as mind, as an undivided spiritual substance distinct from the sensuous images it contains, which is to say that it "knows itself knowing something" [*scit autem se aliquid scientem*] (10.2.6). Augustine's discussion of this basic mode of self-knowing designates for some readers an essential phase of his argument in determining the final version of the *imago dei*.²⁷ In order to judge this discussion in an informed manner, a long quotation is required. Because Augustine's discussion is dense, I will divide it into several parts and comment on each, sometimes afterwards and sometimes by way of preparation. "Can it be," he asks, that the mind

sees in the canon of eternal truth [*in ratione veritatis aeternae*] how beautiful it is to know oneself [*sit nosse semetipsam*], and that it loves this thing that it sees and is at pains to bring it about in itself, because although it does not know itself, it knows how good it would be to know itself? But this is passing strange, not yet to know oneself [*nondum se nosse*], and already to know how beautiful it is to know oneself [*se nosse, iam nosse*].

Changeless truth itself, in which Augustine has believed since his early manhood, tells us that there must be a mode of self-knowledge that precedes the explicit self-knowledge that one seeks; otherwise, one would not know where to look for this knowledge. But one cannot rely on the cuing of eternal truth that it is a very fine thing to know oneself; one must begin the quest for self-knowledge oneself. Maybe the mind remembers its proper end of being blessed, the way to which is self-knowledge? The idea is canvassed:

Perhaps then the mind sees some excellent end, that is its own security and happiness, through some obscure memory which has not deserted it on its travels to far countries and it believes it can only reach this end by knowing itself [*se ipsam cognoverit*].

Readers of the *Confessiones* will remember the powerful, bewildered words of longing for the blessed life in book ten. “Is not the happy life that which all desire, which indeed no one fails to desire? But how have they known about it so as to want it? Where did they see it to love it? Certainly we have the desire for it, but how I do not know.”²⁸ Those same readers will recall the question that guides Augustine to an answer: “My question is whether the happy life is in the memory. For we would not love it if we did not know what it is” [*sed quaero, utrum in memoria sit beata vita. Neque enim amaremus eam, nisi nossemus*] (10.20.29). (Once again, we must weigh the English verb “know” with care, being aware that it does not pick out a clear, definite cognition of something (e.g., “I know that I have ten fingers”) but says that we must learn of the happy life or find out about it.) In *De trinitate* Augustine continues the same train of thought he started in the *Confessiones*. Now, though, he approaches it, as the allusion to Luke 15:11-32 suggests, by way of the parable of the prodigal son.

Even though the son has left his family, the Holy Land and the possibility of strictly following Torah, even though he has traveled to a “distant country” [χώραν μακράν] where he has ruined himself, partly through *curiositas*, the prodigal son retains an obscure memory of his father’s house and how even servants are treated there. (In speaking of the faint or puzzling memory of God, Augustine alludes to 1 Cor. 12: 13.²⁹) When he has “come to his senses” he begins to understand his true end, which was somehow contained in his beginning. The true unknown is not the “distant land” but the place from which one has left, one’s own mind as it was in the beginning, and it was never wholly unknown; it was there one was happy without being able to grasp why. This original mental orientation to blessedness is not quite the same thing as self-knowledge, however:

Thus while it loves [*amat*] this end it seeks knowledge of itself [*hoc quaerit*], and it is on account of the known thing it loves that it seeks the

unknown [*quaerit ignotum*]. But why in this case could the memory of its happiness remain with it while the memory of itself could not, so that as well as knowing that which it wants to reach it might also know itself who wants to reach? [*Sed cur memoria beatitudinis suae potuit, et memoria sui cum ea perdurare non potuit, ut tam se nosset quae vult pervenire, quam novit illud quo vult pervenire?*]

Although one remembers being happy, having once had the assurance of paternal love (and, with it, the blessed life), one does not properly recollect oneself. The solution to the problem being considered pivots not on loving something that is explicitly known but on loving the reflexive operation of simply knowing something:

Or is it that when it loves knowing itself it is not itself that it loves, which it does not yet know, but the very knowing; and it finds it a bitter pill to swallow that it should be missing from its knowledge, with which it wishes to comprehend all things? [*An cum se nosse amat, non se quam nondum novit, sed ipsum nosse amat; acerbiusque tolerat se ipsam deesse scientiae suae, qua vult cuncta comprehendere?*]

So the implicit self-knowing elicits one to reach a more explicit sense of self-knowledge, such as the one that the Delphic Oracle enjoins us to seek. The mind

knows what knowing is, and while it loves this that it knows it also longs to know itself. [*Novit autem quid sit nosse, et dum hoc amat quod novit, etiam se cupit nosse.*]

Explicit self-knowledge is elusive, however, and the basic act of self-knowing involves the mind's knowledge of other things in the world:

But where in this case does it know its knowing, if it does not know itself? [*Ubi ergo nosse suum novit, si se non novit?*] Well, it knows that it knows other things, but does not know itself; thus it also knows what knowing is [*hinc enim novit et quid sit nosse*].³⁰

Of course, the mind grasps itself as it seeks to know:

How comes it then that a mind which does not know itself knows itself knowing something else? [*Quo pacto igitur se aliquid scientem scit, quae se ipsam nescit?*] It is not that it knows another mind knowing, but itself knowing. Therefore it knows itself. And when it seeks to know itself, it already knows itself seeking. So it already knows itself [*Scit igitur se ipsam*].

The mind, then, knows some things while not knowing all things, but it knows both that it knows some things and that it does not know other things. Therefore, the mind has a mode of self-awareness that is prior to explicit self-knowledge, one that does not draw from the outside world:

It follows then that it simply cannot not know itself, since by the very fact of knowing itself not knowing, it knows itself. If it did not know itself not knowing, it would not seek to know itself. For it knows itself seeking and not knowing, while it seeks to know itself [*Novit enim se quaerentem atque nescientem, dum se quaerit ut noverit*] (10.2.5).³¹

In this way, Augustine discloses a tacit act that guarantees the continuous self-identity of *mens*. It is articulated, as the grammar of the passage suggests, by way of a particular verb, *se nosse*.

What are we to make of this wholly interior and ceaseless act, distinguishable from all thematic reflection on oneself? Before anything else, we need to ponder the verb that Augustine prefers when writing of it, *noscere*, which is often used here in the reflexive. As we noticed in the second chapter, at one end of the semantic spectrum the non-reflexive form of the verb means “to know,” while in the broader band it usually means “to learn” or “to get to know” or “to become cognizant of” (or “acquainted with” or “familiar with”). The accent is usually on having a non-theoretical sense of getting to know something or someone, in this case, one’s self. Let us call it “tacit self-knowledge” by which I understand the sense of knowing that one is rather than explicit self-knowledge of a Cartesian kind, on the one hand, or the mere “feel” of selfhood, on

the other hand. Now it has been argued at length that this act of tacit self-knowledge is (in some sense of the verb) the original *imago dei*.³² Nowhere in the argument as just rehearsed does Augustine identify any triad, let alone claim that it is a trinity, though.³³ Readers of book ten must wait for 10.4.17 before the trinity of memory, understanding and will is proposed. We might say, more cautiously, that what Augustine offers here is an unexpected amplification of his early claim that the human intellect is “the best thing in his nature” (5. pro. 2). It is the best part of us, on broad Platonic grounds, because it is spiritual and can know itself; and this is all Augustine needs in order to criticize the materialist accounts of the mind (10.3.8-16) ventured by various Greek philosophers, which he probably encountered in Cicero’s brisk summary of them in the first book of his *Tusculanæ Disputationes*, and which he must reject in order to propose the new trinity of memory, understanding and will.³⁴ If we restrict ourselves to this reading, the argument for deep self-knowledge in the *mens* does not appear to disclose the *imago dei*.

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The stress on the invisible act of *se nosse* must be distinguished from specific acts of *se cogitare*, which are directed towards the world, the role one plays in it, and how one thinks about the two (10.5.7).³⁵ Our human grasp of our self-knowledge differs from God’s hold on his self-knowledge because, for us, only *se nosse* can let us know ourselves as beings that continue through a period of time. Deep down, the mind knows itself as spiritual substance without reference to sensuous images. So our self-knowledge (which undergirds our sense of self-identity) is hidden from the world, but God, whose self-knowledge and self-identity are eternal and unchanging, can look upon the world as readily as he can look upon himself.³⁶ We need not refer to our fundamental self-knowledge; indeed, most of us do not think at that level and in

that manner at all frequently, if ever at all. As Augustine goes on to say, “it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think about oneself” [*aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare*] (10.2.7). When I explicitly reflect on myself, I find one or more images of my past acts and desires, and of course their objects, and must judge them in one or another way, and so the possibility of error about myself, even self-delusion, creeps in. (Hence the continual appropriateness of the Delphic Oracle’s injunction.) The same does not happen with God: he gazes upon the world and remains unchanged by what he sees. According to Augustine, he does not enjoy what he sees, however.³⁷

Only after affirming and defending the spiritual nature of our deep selves does Augustine attempt another draft of the *imago dei*. This trinity consists, he says, in “memory, understanding, and will” [*memoriam, intellegentiam, voluntatem*] (10.4.17). At first the triad seems to have been plucked straight out of the air, but then we are offered some justification for it; for we judge a person as to his or her disposition, learning and practice, that is, what he or she can do with memory, understanding and will. It is important to realize that Augustine is not adducing evidence specific to a Christian. The *imago dei* is imprinted on the minds of all men and women, and children too, for that matter — heretics, *incerti*, Jews, pagans, skeptics, sinners — as follows from the first chapter of Genesis, and nothing is said there about it varying with the strength of our religious faith or moral practice. The Christian will remember God, seek to understand him (through faith in Christ), and apply one’s will in order to love him and the neighbor. Someone who is not a Christian, at least not in Augustine’s high estimation of what that calling demands of one, will also have a memory of God, will be jogged to understand him, and will be stirred to act with respect to the deity; but this person will not animate the *imago dei* until he or she is reborn in Christ through belief in his redemptive acts and begins to live in accord with that belief.

Whether or not the *imago* as proposed, even though it will not be equal to the reality of God, truly reflects the Trinity is still to be determined. Certainly, the three terms are profoundly involved, each in the other (as well as in the other two), so that “my will also contains my whole understanding and my whole memory while I use the whole of what I understand and remember” (10.4.18). Shortly after saying this, Augustine quietly seeks to clarify the triad. He draws upon the language of ascent again, even though he is writing in the mode of analogy, for analogy, properly conceived and practiced, raises our minds to higher things. “Are we already then in a position to rise [*ascendendum*] with all our powers of concentration to that supreme and most high being of which the human mind is the unequal image, but the image nonetheless?” (10.4.19) In answering yes to the question, Augustine (and, presumably, his reader), would be in a position to assimilate the earlier trinity, ventured in 9.1.4, of *mens, notitia* and *amor* (although he writes a word corresponding to *voluntas*) to the later trinity, proposed in 10.4.17) of *memoria, intelligentia* and *voluntas* (although he writes *amor*). If the mind always knows itself and loves itself, it must also remember itself, understand itself, and will itself.

There is a nagging reservation or two about the assimilation of the two trinities. For the version that we now have before us “does not always think about itself distinctly from things that are not what it is” [*quamvis non semper se cogitare discretam ab eis quae non sunt, quod ipsa est*] (10.4.19). The impurity in question is, as we are told, “the force of love that when the mind has been thinking about things with love for a long time and has got stuck to them with the glue of care, it drags them along with itself even when it returns after a fashion to thinking about itself” (10.2.7). I will come back to this force in a moment. The other reservation is that, if one brackets this gluey love, *memoria sui* cannot be strictly distinguished from *intelligentia sui*, for thought would be recalled and understood right away and what is understood would never be absent from the memory, and both mental acts would be affirmed by the will because there would be

no gap between the willing and what is willed. Presumably, this trinity untouched by love of sensuous images would be the *imago dei* as it was in the beginning or, rather, all that we can imagine it to be. It is no more than a theoretical entity, since the *imago* has long been cloyed by human attachment to sensuous images; yet some of these worldly images are to be accorded a place in our overcoming of sin. Augustine realizes that he needs to attend to “things that are added to our awareness in time, and what happens to it in a time sequence when it remembers something it did not remember before, and sees something it did not see before, and loves something it did not love before.”

Before continuing, it should be pointed out that Augustine seems not to notice that he has not specified love (*amor*) in the latest stage of determining the *imago dei*, only the broader category of will (*voluntas*). Certainly, we are well used to encountering this category when reading Augustine, so much so that we tread with care when we do.³⁸ Glancing ahead, we will hear Augustine say, “What else after all is charity but the will?” [*Nam quid est aliud caritas, quam voluntas?*] (15.5.38). Perhaps so, with certain caveats, such as that the will must co-operate with Grace; but we cannot ask, in just as breezy a manner, “What else after all is the will but charity?” We might well think of divine sovereignty, for instance, rather than of being embraced by *caritas* or *dilectio*. With any mention of the will, we are also likely to recall our fallen condition, how we were led away from God by misplaced attention to the sensuous world; and we will also consider how it is proposed that we ameliorate our dire situation. Accordingly, we might wonder about the emphasis on self-love in both drafts of the image. That healthy self-love, in the sense of self-esteem (which would include aesthetic, prudential and moral elements), is required is evident; otherwise, the image would hardly comport with the desire to persist in life or achieve well-being, let alone elicit us to reach the desired end of happiness. Immortality without happiness would be hell. If the image is to resemble the divine being, even

very imperfectly, we should expect that love would be outwardly directed as well as inwardly directed. And this is not yet apparent in the letter of Augustine's treatise.

What is apparent in this compact conclusion to book ten is that, although Augustine at no time mentions a trinity when establishing the inmost self-knowledge of the mind in 10.2.5-7, he nonetheless takes the trinity of *memoria sui*, *intelligentia sui* and *voluntas sui*, announced only in 10.4.17-19, to abide in that perpetual act of tacit self-knowledge. It is, he says, one of the things "which the mind is certain about as regards itself" (10.4.17). Now it has been objected that this claim amounts to denying any difference between the human mind and the triune God, but, whatever others have said to give that impression, Augustine makes no such suggestion.³⁹ He wishes to assert that the *imago dei* distinguishes the human being in the *mens*, not that the *mens* is exactly the same as the triune God, whether in content or in structure. Later, in book fourteen, he reflects on his method: "For although the human mind is not of the same nature as God," he writes, "still the image of that nature than which no nature is better is to be sought and found in that part of us than which our nature also has nothing better. But first the mind must be considered in itself, and God's image discovered in it before it participates in him" [*Sed prius mens in se ipsa consideranda est antequam sit particeps Dei, et in ea reperienda est imago eius*] (14.3.11). The divine image is found in the rooted self-knowledge of the human being, and since it is eternal one would not expect it to exhibit a temporal sequence. That it is not the whole of the *mens* is evident, if only because it is very far from obvious to even intelligent and reflective people that there is a profound and constant self-knowledge in the hidden recesses of the mind. It requires the acumen of an Augustine to discern it. The rest of our *mens* is taken up with knowledge of temporal affairs and action, and these things will have a central role to play in our reformation. Nor can one reasonably claim that the mark in the deep self is, for Augustine, one with God in a strong sense of ontological identity. We are made in the image of God but only

secundum imaginem, Augustine holds. We can tacitly know, understand, and even love ourselves, and we can see that this situation darkly mirrors the triune God, but we also see that this God in whom truth and love are one remains utterly incomprehensible to us.

This situation is vividly seen when Augustine summarizes his argument at the start of book fifteen. He recalls book eight of his treatise:

when we came to charity, which is called God in holy scripture, the glimmerings of a trinity began to appear, namely lover and what is loved and love. However, that inexpressible light beat back our gaze, and somehow convinced us that the weakness of our mind could not yet attuned to it. So to relax our concentration we turned ourselves back in reflection, between the beginning and the completion of our search, to what could be called the more familiar consideration of our own mind insofar as man has been made to the image of God [*ubi ventum est ad caritatem, quae in sancta Scriptura Deus dicta est, eluxit paululum Trinitas, id est, amans, et quod amatur, et amor. Sed quia lux illa ineffabilis nostrum reverberabat obtutum, et ei nondum posse obtemperari nostrae mentis quodam modo convincebatur infirmitas, ad ipsius nostrae mentis, secundum quam factus est homo ad imaginem Dei*] (15.2.10).

Augustine is dazzled by the determination of God as love and retreats to figure him by way of his image in the *mens*.⁴⁰ To encounter the triune God we would have to “trample on the flesh and rise to the spirit [*ascendamus ad animum*]” (8.5.14), presumably to the heights of what came to be called *ratio superior*. That was why Augustine ended book eight giving up the quest to understand the triune God as he is in himself and passing to the *imago* instead. We can know ourselves, to a greater or lesser extent, although not quite as Cicero had in mind; for we know ourselves in relation with God, *ad imaginem Dei*, not ourselves as somehow containing the divine, as the Manichees think. Let us see how this is made clear in the final paragraph of book ten.

Recall the question Augustine poses at the very end of book ten: “Are we already then in a position to rise [*ascendendum*] with all our powers of concentration to that supreme and most

high being of which the human mind is the unequal image, but the image nonetheless?" (10.4.19). On reflection, the implied answer would seem to be no, all the more clearly so when we take note of the question that directly follows the first: "Or have we still to clarify the distinctions between these three in the soul by comparing them with our sensitive grasp of things outside, in which the awareness of bodily things is imprinted on us in a time sequence?" A negative answer to the first question should be forthcoming not because of anything to do with the *imago dei* belonging to our deep selves, which Augustine posits as the case (but does not actually show to be the case in his discussion of self-knowledge) but because its disclosure gives us no reason to think we are ready to rise to the God who differs so majestically from the image of him to which we are made. His point is that there is a lack of ontological identity between us and God as the divine mark as it is actually within us. The image itself, as we bear it in our long exile from paradise, has at best a diminished epistemic role to play in our lives and only the quietest of soteriological roles to perform. In order to be in position for the ascent "to that supreme and most high being," even in the mode of analogy, we must "discuss things that are added to our awareness in time." Why?

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On my reading, Augustine establishes that the self tacitly knows itself with certainty and then takes a trinity as exemplary of that certainty. Is this what he takes himself to have done? In book fifteen, in his summary of the whole argument of his treatise, he says, "In the tenth book the same matter" – devising a mental trinity – "is treated more thoroughly and with more precision, and brought to the point of uncovering in the mind a clearer trinity, consisting in memory and understanding and will. But we also came to realize that the mind could never be in such a case that it did not remember or understand or love itself, although it did not always

think about itself; and when it did think about itself it did not always distinguish itself in its thought from bodily things [*quamvis non semper se cogitaret, cum autem cogitaret, non se a corporalibus rebus eadem cogitatione discerneret*]” (15.1.5). Once again, we find the distraction of gluey love as evoked in 10.4.18. In order to distinguish this distraction from just and proper interest in the world, Augustine has to train himself and his readers to tell apart trinities to be found in the outer person from those to be found only in the inner person with its *ratio inferior* and *ratio superior*. Such is the business of book eleven, and with that complete, he is free to circle back in book twelve to the trinity appropriate to the inner man, which is characterized by fitting knowledge (*scientia*) which leads to wisdom (*sapientia*), and this true wisdom is considered in the fourteenth book. It is “bestowed on him by God’s gift in an actual sharing in God himself” [*Dei munere in eius ipsius Dei participatione donate*] (15.1.5).

When reading Augustine’s summary of his argument, it is easy to miss his concern about the penultimate stage of formulating the *imago dei*. Two things are at work. On the one hand, the act of self-knowing presents the mind naturally as a spiritual substance without sensuous images (and says nothing negative about these images) and, on the other hand, this mind has already turned away from God, to whose rule it should be subject, in order to reflect on beauties it foolishly takes to be its own and to think illicitly about sensuous images:

Yet such is the force of love that when the mind has been thinking about things with love for a long time and has got stuck to them with the glue of care, it drags them along with itself even when it returns after a fashion to thinking about itself. [*tanta vis est amoris, ut ea quae cum amore diu cogitaverit, eisque curae glutino inhaeserit, attrahat se cum etiam cum ad se cogitandam quodam modo redit*] Now these things are bodies which it has fallen in love with outside itself through the senses of the flesh and got involved with through a kind of long familiarity. But it cannot bring these bodies themselves back inside with it into the region, so to say, of its non-bodily nature; so it wraps up their images and clutches the to itself, images made in itself out of itself. (10.2.7)

Sin originally occurred by way of distraction. Vulnerable, because having the *imago* does not in itself prevent a cataclysmic lapse of attention, the mind has forgotten that it is a pure spiritual substance and “has twisted its desires” [*cupiditatem pravam*] so that it has become concerned with the material things outside it in a disorderly manner.⁴¹ It sees beauties within itself, which it should attribute to God, but it wrongly claims them for itself. The consequence is that the mind can no longer distinguish itself from the sensuous images within it, and this assists in explaining why the Stoics settle upon their materialist doctrines of the human mind. In short, the *mens*, created with tacit self-knowledge, averts its gaze from God in order to enjoy the world which, no matter how beautiful it is, does not and cannot properly offer itself for pure enjoyment.⁴² The mind takes itself to be divine and the world as its own. We pass from the worship of God to idolatry, including self-idolatry.⁴³ In the biblical language I adopted in the first chapter, *tselem* becomes *pesel*. In Augustinian terms, this *pondus*, this downward-dragging weight of misplaced love, is several sins, not just the one; it leads to *voluptas* (unbalanced pleasure in worldly things), *superbia* (unbalanced power over worldly things), and *curiositas* (unbalanced satisfaction in worldly knowledge).⁴⁴

It is worth glancing ahead to book thirteen (and just a little aside once there) to observe that the original twisting of desires includes sexual sin. Despite what we are popularly regaled about Augustine, however, this sin is an example of what generally precipitates the Fall, and not its sole cause. In marriage “the carnal desire dwelling in the genital organs is made good use of by married chastity” – that is, making love only in order to have children – and yet “still it has its involuntary motions which show that either it could not have been present at all in paradise before sin, or if it did exist there that it was not such as would ever resist the will” (13.5.23). For Augustine, sexual desire for one’s husband or wife (or, worse, for others), without procreation as the desired end of the act, exceeds the divinely assigned role of the genital organs. One branch of the disjunction invites us to ponder lovemaking without carnal desire in Eden, while the other branch has carnal desire in paradise

being entirely subservient to the will. In both cases, it would be a rational act, neither unbecoming the dignity of human beings nor unsatisfying for them. When Adam and Eve misconstrued beauty outside God, and took themselves to be their own masters, they precipitated the terrible loss we call the Fall. One sign of this cataclysmic event is that they (and now we) now take each other as objects of desire, and do so in a disordered way, not according primacy to the beauty of the divine ordering of life by which each other's physical attractiveness would not override each person's reason and impel violent acts of will. The cause of the Fall is ultimately idolatry, and one consequence of that act is the making of oneself and one's sexual partner into idols. When one is "being renewed to the image of God" one is being reformed in one's mind, not in one's sexual organs, regardless of whether one is male or female, and so the discipline of the faith should encourage one to rational behavior in pursuing sexual pleasure.⁴⁵ The thought that sexual activity could be tenderness and loving care for one's spouse, that it could be a mutual gift, is not considered.

Augustine re-considers the Fall in book fourteen. Having reminded his "slower readers" (14.4.20), doubtless all of us on certain days, about the nature of the mind, he reflects that when the mind "sees itself it does not see anything unchangeable." The mind tacitly knows itself, as he has argued, but self-knowledge does not imply stasis. Only God does not change.⁴⁶ If the *imago dei* is now coded as the trinity of *memoria sui*, *intelligentia sui* and *voluntas sui*, it too must have changed, for the worse, precisely because of sin. Each person is starkly aware of the state of his or her mind:

Of this it can have no doubt, since it is unhappy and longs to be happy, and its only hope that this will be possible lies in its being changeable. If it were not changeable it could no more switch from unhappy to happy than from happy to unhappy. And what could have made it unhappy under its omnipotent and good Lord, but its own sin and its Lord's justice? And what will make it happy but its own merit and its Lord's reward? But even its merit is the grace of him whose reward will be its happiness. It cannot give itself the justice which it lost and no longer has. It received it when it was created and it lost it of course by sinning. So it also receives the justice by which it can merit happiness. . .
(14.4.21)

In a treatise devoted, almost single-mindedly one might think at times, to prizing the changeless, we read here Augustine finding a value for what changes. Only if we attend to the changing world and participate it can we really reform the *imago dei*. We must make ourselves vulnerable to ordinary human suffering, our own and that of the neighbor, in order to make the *imago* shine. More generally, in order to be happy, one must be able to alter one's state of mind, but one knows full well that with the weight of sin one carries this cannot be achieved without divine succor. Only faith in the divine missions, detailed in books four and thirteen, can overcome the trauma of original sin and the weakness of will, along with everything else that it has bequeathed to us: the continuing state in which our very minds circle around only themselves, their fruitless quest to know the world, regardless of the value of the knowledge they gain, and their endless and often inappropriate desires for what offers itself to the mind. Such is, viewed negatively, the trinity of *memoria sui*, *intelligentia sui*, and *voluntas sui*.

We cannot remember any other situation in which we have been, certainly not the original felicity which must have involved direct, loving communication with God.⁴⁷ Turning to God now, however, allows one to grasp what must have happened in Eden:

But when the mind truly recalls its Lord after receiving his Spirit, it perceives quite simply — for it learns this by a wholly intimate instruction from within — that it cannot rise except by his gracious doing, and that it could not have fallen except by its own willful undoing. Certainly it does not remember its happiness. That was once, and is no more, and the mind has totally forgotten it and therefore cannot even be reminded of it. But it believes the trustworthy documents of its God about it, written by his prophets, when they tell about the bliss of paradise and make down through a historical tradition man's first good and first evil. The mind does however remember its God [*Domini autem Dei sui reminiscitur*]. He always is; it is not the case that he was and is not, or is and was not, but just as he never will not be, so he never was not. And he is all of him everywhere, and therefore the mind lives and moves and is in him, and for this reason is able to remember him. (14.4.21)

On accepting divine Grace, in and through the saving acts of Christ as sacrament and model, one recognizes oneself “in Adam” as responsible for the Fall and that punishment for living a fallen life would be entirely just. All that one has been able to discern before one’s conversion is a trinity of *memoria sui*, *intelligentia sui* and *voluntas sui*; it is a big step along the way to finding God within us, yet it is imperfect. For what it gives us is a trinity that is somewhat skewed: it mostly broods on its own act of self-knowing that abides in a mind that is no more than a false god which has lost its properly basic orientation to God and therefore is without any awareness of its original happiness. Only with Grace does the proper mental trinity begin to be restored to intellectual sight. Yet Grace does not allow us to recall our original felicity; it allows us, however, to remember that there is a God, and I shall come back to this crucial claim in a moment.

Augustine tells us all that I have just related in book fourteen, though only when one has duly acknowledged oneself as responsible “in Adam” for the Fall can we feel the full weight of what is said there: “This trinity of the mind is not really the image of God because the mind remembers and understands and loves itself, but because it is also able to remember and understand and love him by whom it was made” [*potest etiam meminisse, et intellegere, et amare a quo facta est*] (14.4.15). This would be the divine mark, or as close as we can get to it in this postlapsarian life, and it propels us to return to Augustine’s question which he posed at the very end of book ten: “Are we already then in a position to rise with all our powers of concentration to that supreme and most high being of which the human mind is the unequal image, but the image nonetheless?” (10.4.19). We were not ready at that point, for the image was the one within fallen human beings. Nor were we ready at the end of book thirteen when, after being re-centered on Jesus and the life of faith in him, in which Mary is exemplary, we were offered yet another trinity, one of memory, notions of what is believed, and love of what is

believed (13.6.26). “But the image of God. . . is not yet to be found in this trinity,” we were told (13.6.26). To be sure, this trinity is in the inner man, but located in the *ratio inferior*, the object of which is *scientia*, and Augustine is confident that the appropriate version of the *imago dei* will be found in the *ratio superior* (once again to use medieval terms). It is one thing to have ideas generated by faith, to recall them and to affirm them, but quite another to abide in loving communication with Christ, Wisdom itself, which affords one true wisdom. Once again, it will be seen, Augustine inclines to Christ as Wisdom, even in his account of the incarnation, suffering and death of Jesus. Jesus’s preaching of the Kingdom, his concrete compassion for suffering human flesh, is bypassed in favor of reflection on the economy of salvation, one that restricted Jesus’s time on earth as much as was possible while nonetheless fulfilling the divine plan.⁴⁸

Now, in book fourteen we are ready for the analogical ascent to God that was anticipated in book ten; for the final version of the *imago* refers us directly to God. This is not to say that the revived image is exactly the same as the one granted us at creation, for now we are referred to God in and through Scripture (by way of the Church) and then, presumably, we were formed to be naturally intimate with him and able freely to enjoy the contemplation of his goodness.⁴⁹ But the revived image allows us to rise. We do not do so by our own abilities, which have become mired in the sensuous world about us, and with which we have a warped relation even now, for we still sin. Rather, we rise by appropriating the faith that has been given to us in order to understand God a little better than we have done in the past. Our watchword becomes *credere in deum*; we are drawn to divine beauty in and through love; we are daily transformed into new men and women by our acts of virtue. One question that remains is the relation between the final version of the *imago dei*, as stated in book fourteen, and the earlier version, advanced in book ten, which was posited in the act of self-knowing at the base of the mind.

Another question, barely touched upon, is how the mind learns of God and divine Grace in order to rise to its Author. A further question is the role imagined for the revived *imago dei*. I will briefly consider each in turn.

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At the end of book ten Augustine presented a version of the *imago dei* that he believed to be at the base of the human act of self-knowing. It was not the divine image as graciously given to Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Not at all: it was the image of God only as it could be discerned, with considerable intellectual application, in our dull and broken state, albeit by someone thoroughly converted and convinced as a Christian. The *imago* had already changed; it had lost its sparkle because it had been debased as the subject of self-idolatry; and in any case it was impossible to see the original image to which we had been made. Only by bending to Christ, both in the inner man and in the exterior man, can one begin to revive the *imago*, to change it for the better, for now we have the opportunity to gain wisdom (*sapientia*) by which we may participate here and now in the divine life. This image is “man in terms of mind; the mind which is being renewed in the recognition of God according to the image of him who created (Col. 3:10) man to his own image, and which thus achieves wisdom in the contemplation of things eternal” [*quae renovatur in agnitione Dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit hominem ad imaginem suam, et sic percipit sapientiam ubi contemplatio est aeternorum*] (15.1.5).

There is much to be drawn from this brief passage. For now, with regard to the first question posed, it is important to notice that the *imago dei*, as Augustine finally proposes it when rehearsing the argument of his entire treatise, “is being renewed.”⁵⁰ So, there are not two images corresponding to oneself in Adam and oneself in Christ, not an inner image and an outer image, not one new image superimposed upon an older, but just the one image that has

been distorted and dulled by sin and is being revived.⁵¹ This process of revivification occurs at the level of *se cogitare*, which is needed for the mind to achieve wisdom. One must look upon the world, which includes the activities of the neighbor, and also images of the life of Jesus; and one must act in the world, turbulent and uninviting as it often is, aided all the while by divine Grace.⁵² The mind is not to crave knowledge just for the sake of knowledge, which would be to succumb to *curiositas*; there must be a conversion of the gaze, so that one turns inwards and thereby achieves wisdom. This conversion is not once for all time, so that one no longer needs to be directed inwardly and indeed does not need to look at the world and all that happens there. The changing world is our twisting and turning path to renewal, one that we walk with Christ. Yet there is always a pull to turn inwards; otherwise there would be no point in gazing upon the world and its people, let alone meditating on the life of Jesus: one would learn nothing salient of life and be of no support to the neighbor.

If the *imago dei* has been dulled by sin, how does one learn of the one true God? The question had harried Augustine since his conversion, and it had done so earlier as well, though not in quite that form. He had had recourse early on in his Christian life to the *impressæ notionēs*, as we have seen, and strongly held that the combination of reason and authority (with the conviction involved in πίστις or *fides* was sufficient to point anyone with an open, rational mind to the Christian God. In *De trinitate* he keeps faith with his younger self not by relying on a proof, in the modern sense of the word, that God exists, although he by no means rejects what he achieved in his earlier years. Instead, he teaches that the mind always remembers God to some extent, that it always has the opportunity to refer to the truths of reason, moral values, and the idea of God. The reason offered is Scriptural; it is because the mind “lives and moves and is in him” (Acts 17:28). Yet this verse does not explain exactly how the mind remembers God, and so Augustine continues:

Not that it remembers him because it knew him in Adam, or anywhere else before the life of this body, or when it was first made in order to be inserted into this body. It does not remember any of these things at all; whichever of these may be the case, it has been erased by oblivion. Yet it is reminded to turn to the Lord, as though to the light by which it went on being touched in some fashion even when it turned away from him. [*Sed commemoratur, ut convertatur ad Dominum, tanquam ad eam lucem qua etiam cum ab illo averteretur quodam modo tangebatur.*] It is in virtue of this light that even the godless can think about eternity, and rightly praise and blame many elements in the behavior of men. (14.4.21)

In *De Genesi ad litteram*, which Augustine commenced around the time he started composing *De trinitate* and which was completed some years before the treatise, a two-step understanding of the creation of human beings had been proposed: Adam was first conceived in the divine mind and then placed in a physical body.⁵³ We have no memory of abiding in the divine mind, and even our recollection of our life in the Garden of Eden has been completely erased.

We remember God, however, because the divine light touches us, even when we turn away from it.⁵⁴ Augustine's very introduction of this divine light suggests that he does not have a clear or firm idea of its exact provenance or the manner of its illumination. The mind "is reminded to turn to the Lord, *as though* [tanquam] to the light by which it went on being touched *in some fashion* [quodam] even when it turned away from him" (my emphases). The conjunction and the adverb bespeak discretion even in a teaching that Augustine offers in many places. (It is here that we may well remember Traherne's words about "some great thing doth touch our souls" and that we are invisibly drawn to it without quite knowing it in any clarified fashion. And it is here, too, that we may recall William of St Thierry's words on the soul passing from *intellectus rationis*, which is entirely proper to understanding, to *intellectus amoris*, which occurs when the soul senses God and begins to taste him.) He has done so a little earlier in *De trinitate*, in a passage on Plato, which follows his rejection of the doctrine of transmigration of

souls, which he takes to be merely a matter of false memories. He pivots away from transmigration to the nature of the *lux mentium*. It has been a longstanding theme for Augustine; we can find it as early as the *Soliloquia* 1.22 and, as this passage shows, it has never been forgotten:

The conclusion we should rather draw is that the nature of the intellectual mind has been so established by the disposition of its creator that it is subjoined to intelligible things in the order of nature, and so it sees such truths in a kind of non-bodily light that is *sui generis* [*sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea*], just as our eyes of flesh see all these things that lie around us in this bodily light, a light they were created to be receptive of and to match. (12.4.24)

The appeal to Plato has in no way prevented diverse interpretations of this peculiar light, the two main poles of which have been Dominican and Franciscan.⁵⁵ In the former camp, one finds first and foremost Aquinas (for whom the active intellect is the source of illumination) and in the latter camp, there are Bonaventure, William of Auvergne, and others (for whom illumination comes directly from God). I leave this debate, intense and valuable as it is, aside, for it would take us into away from narrow consideration of the *imago dei* to Augustine's diverse medieval heritages, indeed, to the generation of several "Augustines."⁵⁶

De Genesi ad litteram brings us a little closer to seeing how the *imago dei* and the *lux mentium* relate to one another. When considering the creation narrative in the first chapter of Genesis Augustine has recourse, as he often does, to Paul. He joins together two similar passages: "Be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and put on the new nature, created after the likeness of God [κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα; *secundum Deum creatus est*] in true righteousness and holiness" (Eph. 4: 23-24) and "Put on the new nature, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator [εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτὸν; *secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum*] (Col. 3:10). With these verses as a lens placed over Gen. 1: 27, we can plainly see "just in

what part man was created to God's image – that it was not in the features of the body but in a certain form of the illuminated mind" [*sed quadam forma intellegibili mentis illuminatae*].⁵⁷ The *imago*, it seems, is a form that is in a mind that has been illuminated by God; it is not itself what illuminates the mind. The divine illumination is always present, even if we have forsaken it for misplaced love of the flesh and its pleasures, and one of its modes of presence is a deep-seated memory of God. Towards the end of the *Confessiones*, Augustine imagines God speaking to him and reminding him that "I do not speak in the successiveness of time" (13.29.44). We are not to look for God or divine Grace in and through our memory of images, or even our passions, which are temporal. For God speaks to us in the present from our past, even (to an extent) from a past that has not been present to us, such as in the *impressæ notiones*, including blessedness. It is when we are convicted that there is Truth that we begin to learn of God, and the conviction is deep and immovable, since we realize that there must be Truth if we are to recognize anything as true and to speak accordingly. Only if there is Truth can we progress to a state of blessedness. More generally, our lives would be incoherent without recourse to reliable truths, and so there must be something we can call Truth. We come to understand Truth as God, and following the Christian life, renewing the *imago dei*, enables us to understand over time that this Truth is Love.

Augustine retrospectively is enabled to see God deep within his memory. In the well-known words of the *Confessiones*: "you were more inward than my most inward part and higher than the highest element within me [*interior intimo meo et superior summo meo*]" (3.6.11). The role of the reformed *imago dei*, then, is to direct us back to God in terms of remembering him, understanding him, and loving him. This reformation can occur only if one turns back to the light of wisdom that the Lord graciously offers us at all times and only if one then gazes upon the world and acts worthily in it.⁵⁸ The changeless and the changing are to be held in tandem.

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It is worth pausing in order to acknowledge just how far Augustine has ventured from Scripture in his account of the *imago dei*. The first chapter of Genesis specifies that human beings, unlike the other animals, are made according to the *tselem* but does not say what it is and says nothing at all about it ever becoming broken or dull and needing to be reformed. Augustine, however, explicitly denotes where the *tselem* is (the intellect), and what it is (a mental structure of remembering, understanding, and loving God). A short passage in Genesis has been elaborated in the general context of late classical philosophy so as to form an entire theology of being human, indeed, of being human in relation with God. Of course, Augustine is clear that he is not attempting to circumscribe the divine reality. His task is actually modest, despite the bulk of his treatise: he is merely offering analogies for the Trinity in whose image we have been made, and in the final book of *De trinitate* he emphasizes the inadequacy of all he has done in the previous fourteen books, right up to and including the final draft of the *imago*. The mental image, he says, is dissimilar with respect to the eternal birth of the Son by the Father, and he goes on to say that it is also dissimilar with respect to the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. To reflect on the *imago dei*, for Augustine, is to be caught in an endless dialectic of “like” and “unlike”; the trinities have been useful to the extent that they lead us to the eternal God; the *ordo fides* points to the *ordo amoris*, but the *ordo amoris* transcends the limits of our intellects, our hearts, and our imaginations. One thing that Augustine does not explicitly signal as inadequate is his pressing on human self-love; another thing, perhaps related, is what seems to be a somewhat reserved account of the love of neighbor.

The legitimacy of self-love, as Augustine understands it, turns, as we have seen, on the claim that love is a spiritual substance, not just a disposition of the *mens*. Yet we have been given no reason by him to think that it is. More worryingly, if the *imago dei* is to be of God, then

one would look for love to be directed to others, especially the neighbor. Divine self-love is inevitable and to be affirmed because God *is* love, whereas for us, even were human love a spiritual substance, it would be merely something that we *have* (or that dwells in us by divine Grace). Augustine himself draws the distinction in book fifteen of *De trinitate* in underlining the inadequacy of the *imago dei* to God. Nonetheless, he leaves us with an *imago dei* distinguished in the first instance by self-love. Of course, the *imago* would be imperfect even if it figured love as outwardly directed; but it would surely be less disconcerting. Now one might argue, as Peter Lombard does in *Sententiae* 1.17, that what Augustine has in mind here is that our love is nothing other than the Holy Spirit. If so, one saves the claim that love is a spiritual substance; but nothing is done about the uneasy sense that the love of neighbor as developed in Augustine does not converge with what we are taught in the Gospel. That there are sound reasons not to agree with Lombard has been made very plain by Aquinas, early and late, and although Lombard has had able defenders, I do not propose to enter that complicated debate here.⁵⁹ It would require another book, and a long one at that, and were I to start it, I would try to separate Augustine's views from those that one finds in Lombard, and would incline, in several places, to Aquinas's criticisms, all the while stressing two things, as Aquinas does, that for Augustine our love is in motion (and therefore not God) and that the love one has through participation does not result in love as such.⁶⁰ In *De doctrina Christiana* Augustine tells us that we should not love ourselves for our own sakes but for the sake of God: *Si ergo teipsum non propter te debes diligere, sed propter illum ubi dilectionis tuae rectissimus finis est* (1.22.21). This is our love, flawed as it is, and not a higher love that is itself divine, even though we are surely visited by that love and graced to have it dwell in us. Instead, I turn to consider more fully than I have done earlier what Augustine says about the neighbor.

We have seen that Augustine thinks that the love of neighbor is a duty imposed on us by God, and in this he is undoubtedly right. We are specifically commanded to love the neighbor as ourselves. In modern times, some people have found it difficult to sanction that one can be directed to love anyone; and yet the love in question, ἀγάπη, is quite different from ἔρως, φιλία or even στοργή. We cannot rightly be obliged to engage in a romantic relationship with a woman or a man, nor can we be ordered to form a warm friendship with someone, and we will bristle even at the thought of being required to show affection to our parents or our children. These things are natural, we tell ourselves, even if there is a degree of cultural formation involved, and no exercise of authority, even divine authority, can make another person attractive to us as a spouse or as a friend, and for the most part it is not needed with respect to one's immediate family. We have no natural ties to the neighbor, the person who crosses our path of life, expectedly or not, and needs our help. Most often, we know little or nothing about him or her before he or she appears before us; and at times a neighbor can be irritating, sick, unappealing, ungrateful, even out to cheat us. Yet we are charged to love him or her, which means to pass from feeling compassion for his or her state or situation to acting so as to aid the person in a concrete manner. (The Gospel gives us several examples of Jesus's compassion.⁶¹) "Love," here, can be figured by way of exercise of virtue, which can sound chillier than it really is; it can also be seen as a mode of justice. Without compassion as its prompt, though, it will be too smooth or too blunt to count as love: we all know the expression "cold as charity." Compassionate love does not entail friendship or romance or even affection of the sort one has for family members. The Good Samaritan of Jesus's parable (Luke 10: 25-37), the canonical biblical text for Christians about the meaning of "neighbor," supports the injured man on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho, but nonetheless goes about his business once he is in safe hands and does not attempt to make the man into a friend. Compassion has a brief temporality, which

is why we must be ordained to act upon it; but even an act of love often comes to a natural end when a person crosses our path and then goes on

Now it will readily be recognized that the parable of the Good Samaritan makes no mention of the virtue of the man who has been injured by robbers. The Samaritan has no idea whatsoever of the depth of the person's moral life, the seriousness of his commitment to his religious practices, or anything of the sort, and if he notices anything about his ethnicity or social status, it is not related as important. What the Samaritan sees, instantly, is that the beaten man needs succor, and he acts accordingly, giving of his own supplies of oil and wine, and putting the hurt man on the sole animal he has so that he must now walk on the stony path instead of ride over it. There is no gap between compassion and action, no consideration of for how long he must walk — the barren road between the two cities is eighteen miles long — or that he is exposing himself to other robbers or that there is no possibility of getting more food or water on the way. The beaten man, like the Samaritan himself, is a fallen creature of God, and the ground of neighbor love here is taking oneself to be the first person on the scene who can give aid and then showing mercy. (We know that he is not the first person, but he has no idea of the priest and the Levite who have passed by earlier, most likely, given the narrowness of the path, walking over the wounded man; and it is always the same: we cannot have recourse to the self-assurance, "No one else has helped, so why should I?" or, more reasonably, "I am not the best placed person to help!") We do not know if the Samaritan acts against his nature because he has been called by God to do so or because he has long ago internalized the commandment and now acts to aid others as his second nature. The point of the parable is that he offers succor, and so Jesus figures "neighbor" not as one's fellow Jew, as the lawyer would have anticipated from Lev. 19:18, but as the one who succors a person in distress.⁶²

A parable is a parable, however, and a treatise is a treatise; and one might expect that the account of the reformation of the *imago dei* would lead to further reflection on the love of neighbor. The deepening of the Christian life is certainly of intense and abiding interest to Augustine; it leads to the enjoyment of the love of God by way of contemplation. As we have seen, we should not be too quick to regard this as a spiritual exercise that only individuals can practice; we have already pondered the event at Ostia in which Monica's loving presence, as a fellow Christian (albeit of a wholly different character), is needed for Augustine to touch God. Nonetheless, there is no concurrent deepening suggested of the love of neighbor, no shift from being commanded to love him or her to the development of such love as a second nature. It seems to be in our first nature to feel compassion for people who need our help, but that first nature, sinful as it is, has many reasonable ways of limiting or stymying action once it has been motivated to act. The transformation of self by way of the renovation of the *imago dei*, performed through divine grace, should over time transform one's first nature into a second nature, from Adam to Christ, so that the passage from compassion to action, the embodying of ἀγάπη, comes more and more directly. And that stirring of love should bracket whatever virtue, if any, the neighbor has, and be motivated solely by compassion for a fellow sinner who is beloved of God.

In the previous chapter I quoted Augustine's words on love of self in *De doctrina Christiana*. Now I will circle back to that same passage in order to quote him on the love of neighbor. He begins by reminding us what we are told in Genesis, that we are made to the image and likeness of God and adds that this image is our rational soul. Then he continues:

We have been commanded, after all, to love one another; but the question is whether people are to be loved by others for their own sake, or for the sake of something else. If it is for their own sake, then they are things for us to enjoy; if it is for the sake of something else, they are for us to use. [*Si enim propter se, fruimur*

eo; si propter aliud, utimur eo]. Now it seems to me that they are to be loved for the sake of something else [*Videtur autem mihi propter aliud diligendus*], because if a thing is to be loved for its own sake, it means that it constitutes the life of bliss, which consoles us in this present time with the hope of it, even though not yet with its reality. *Cursed, however, is the one who places his hopes in man* (Jer. 17:5). (1.22.20)

On reading this passage, along with others like it, one might well wish that Augustine had drawn a less tight distinction between *uti* and *frui*, use and enjoyment, since it seems to have led him to a perspective on human beings that is scarcely borne out by the Gospel. We should not reject the distinction too quickly. It is possible both to use and enjoy something, as Augustine admits (1.3.3), yet some things are to be used, not enjoyed, and to mistake which is which leads to moral dangers: “we are impeded in our own progress, and sometimes are also deflected from our course [*impeditur cursus noster et aliquando etiam deflectitur*], because we are thereby delayed in obtaining what we should be enjoying, or turned back from it altogether, blocked by our love for inferior things” (1.3.3). “Use” here “consists in referring what has come your way to what your love aims at obtaining, provided, that is, that it deserves to be loved” (1.4.4).

There is not likely to be an objection to these remarks, if one is just using things, but Augustine does not shy away from including other people in this group, beginning with oneself. “So if you ought not to love yourself for your own sake, but for the sake of the one to whom your love is most rightly directed as its end, other people must not take offense if you also love them for God’s sake and not their own” (1.22.21). If Freud has given us a whole climate of opinion, some of which distorts what he actually wrote, the same is largely true of Kant, at least in the United States with our broad puritan heritage. We tend to think of human beings as ends in themselves, and to think the categorical imperative and the golden rule together, even if we are not too sure of exactly what is said in one or another of Kant’s ethical treatises, and even if we would come a cropper if asked to defend those ill digested ideas before

a well-informed moral intuitionist, utilitarian or virtue theorist. If we read the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Ethics* (1785), though, we will find that the second formulation of the categorical imperative reads: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”⁶³ A person, here, is a rational agent; and while Kant and Augustine have quite different accounts of rationality, they at least converge on prizing reason with respect to the moral behavior of human beings. Notice that Kant does not say never to treat another person as a means, only that, if one does, one must also treat him or her as an end. Are Kant and Augustine in conflict, or, to retreat to a far weaker question, are our modern moral sensibilities violated by Augustine?

The question is best answered by enlarging the context as much as possible, far more than Kant would have welcomed, so that it includes one’s spiritual welfare as taught by the Church as well as one moral state as monitored by one’s conscience. For Augustine, I am not loving another person properly if I allow him or her to stand between God and myself; rather, I would love that person in a fitting manner were my relations with him or her always accompanied by an informed concern for his or her spiritual happiness. I love someone best, Augustine proposes, when I love the whole person, as a mortal being with eternity before him or her, and not just with respect to his or her limited desires and challenges in this world. It would be unjust to Augustine to regard this as dour. It is a matter of right ordering of love, not the diminishment of human love. When he turns to consider “the whole ordering of time,” he says, “This we should be making use of with a certain love and delight [*dilectione et delectatione*] that is not, so to say, permanently settled in, but transitory, rather, and casual, like love and delight in a road, or in vehicles, or any other tools and gadgets you like, or if you can think of any better way of putting it, so that we love the means by which we are being carried along, on account of the goal to which we are being carried” (1.35.39).

The problem, then, is not Augustine's grim view of things, which at times would incline to the tragic were it not for his Christianity, for he allows us to enjoy ourselves and one another if we have the right spiritual goal.⁶⁴ Rather, the challenge is that he tends to focus on one's own spiritual pilgrimage and to consider other people primarily with respect to it; and he tends to prize love, ἀγάπη or *caritas*, without it being stimulated by compassion. "No sinner, precisely as sinner, is to be loved" (1.27.28). Surely not: the sin cannot be loved, but compassion for the sinner, precisely as sinner (just like oneself), should generate love for him or her, which first of all means helping him or her out of his immediate situation of suffering. When Jesus says to the woman taken in adultery, "Go, and sin no more [ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν μηκέτι ἁμάρτανε]," he alone has already felt compassion for her among all those men who wish to stone her, and he acts in love. He does not act sentimentally: his final words to her are among the most difficult to follow in any language. Paul's hyperbole is also hard to reconcile with Augustine's emphasis on one's own relationship with Christ: "For I could wish that I myself were accursed and cut off from Christ for the sake of my brethren, my kinsmen by race" (Rom. 9:3). Whatever this cry of desolation is, and whatever we are to make of it in terms of Paul's theology as a whole, it is not a construction of love of neighbor as a duty.

For Augustine, my love for the neighbor would be fulfilled in orienting him or her, by whatever means I have, to the contemplation of God. I love the neighbor in and through God, and he or she loves me in exactly the same way. The Kingdom is decentered with respect to persons and centered with regard to God. We doubtless feel with Augustine, as with Kant, that duty supervenes with respect to love sparked by compassion. Even if we contemplate God, enjoying him and never seeking to use him, we cannot expect a symmetric relationship with God. Augustine is plain that the deity uses us and does not enjoy us. "If he enjoys us, it means he is in need of some good of ours," he says (1.31.34). But is it not possible to enjoy someone

without requiring anything of him or her? Someone walking past a park on the way to an appointment sees children playing and enjoys the scene of their happiness and does not require anything more. One might admit that his or her spirits are momentarily lifted, but it seems mistaken to say that the sight of the children playing is used by the passerby to supply that end. Indeed, one might wish to go a little further and say that there are modes of enjoyment that come only when the spectacle one views is of no use to one at all.

It also needs to be said that it is difficult to square Augustine's sharp distinction between *frui* and *uti* as it applies to God with what Scripture attests. Think of Psalm 104:31: "may the LORD rejoice in his works." Certainly, his works, the whole created world about us, are not needed to bolster divine perfection. They were not when they were created, either, which was before humankind was made. And think of Psalm 149:4: "For the LORD takes pleasure [*ratsah*] in his people." Think too of Luke 15:7, in which Jesus says, "Just so, I tell you, there will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons who need no repentance." It could not be that this joy is exclusively angelic, for the angels could not rejoice without God also being joyful. And yet does God actually use a converted sinner? The created world about us benefits all humans, and inclining to God benefits the sinner, to be sure. God is not enhanced by either, Augustine says, which is true insofar as his goodness does not change. Perhaps it precisely because God does not need anything from us that he is free to rejoice in what he sees, and perhaps this is what Scripture alerts us to.

When Augustine concludes the first book of *De doctrina Christiana* he quotes 1 Tim. 1:5: "the aim of our charge is love [ἀγάπη] that issues from a pure heart [ἐκ καθαρᾶς καρδίας] and a good conscience and sincere faith." He adds, "When he said *love*, you see, he added *from a pure heart*, meaning that nothing else is loved except what should be loved" (1.40.44). The biblical word for purity, here, means cleanliness, freedom from guilt and sin, which theologically is to

be achieved by Grace and self-discipline, and which distances the pure heart from all idolatry. Purity need not be taken to point us single-mindedly to God as Truth, however; it need not be regarded as only or even primarily bespeaking interiority, for it can also mean love purified of conditions and reservations, many of which come from the intellect as from the will, a love for God that spills over in our lives on earth. We are to love God, certainly, and the neighbor as ourselves. This last clause does not result in the sort of self-love that occurs in Augustine's analogy with divine self-love, which, if anything, stymies love, and it does not figure love of neighbor always as duty. The love we bear for God seeks God, for like goes in quest of like, and it returns and transforms the image in which we have been made. That transformation occurs, as Augustine saw, in graced and loving attention to the world and its people; but without compassion this attention and the acts that come from it have little of the divine about them. If we become vulnerable to divine justice because our *imago dei* is allowed to break and become dull, we become vulnerable to love on earth when it starts to shine. Our sanctification begins in turning to the Lord, and it is rendered concrete in our acts of compassion for others so that the love we bear towards them is oriented by it and suffused with it. In so doing we respond well to the image in which we have been made. The only thing that resembles Love is love.

¹ See Plotinus, *en.*, 5.2.1, 3.8.7.

² Not that Arianism is anything with which I will be particularly concerned here, but it should be emphasized that it is historically very far from being a unified movement, and not all "Arians" looked back to Arius for their theological inspiration. Some of the people known as "Arians," Eudoxius for example, affirmed that Christ was like the Father in substance (ὁμοούσιος) while others, such as Eunomius, argued that there was no resemblance at all

(ἔτεροουσιος). For Ulfila, see Peter Heather and John Matthews, *The Goths in the Fourth Century* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1991), 133-53.

³ Here we approach the crux of Lombard's *Sententiae*, 1.17.

⁴ For the elaboration and defense of appropriation of essential qualities of the trinitarian persons, see Aquinas, *ST.*, 1a q. 39 art. 7. One finds appropriation in the trinitarian theology of the twelfth century, although it is not clearly formulated until the following century. See Hugh of St Victor, *d sac.*, 1.2.6.

⁵ Cicero, *Tusc.*, 1.22.52. Also see *fin.*, 5.14.44 and *leg.*, 1.22.58.

⁶ See, in particular, Sextus Empiricus, *ad. math.*, 7.284-6.

⁷ W. H. Auden, "In Memory of Sigmund Freud," *Collected Poems* (New York: Random House, 1991), 273-75. It might be added that orthodox Freudians tend to think *de facto* of a trinity in the mind: id, ego, and superego.

⁸ I take the distinction from Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations" Generally Known as "The Blue and Brown Books"* (1958; rpt. New York: Harper and Row, 1965), *The Blue Book*, 46-48. For a sharply thought account of Augustine here, see Ludger Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind: Augustine's Philosophical Arguments for the Human Soul as a Spiritual Substance* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986). For a historical narrative by several hands, in which Augustine plays an important role, see Ursula Renz, *Self-Knowledge: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁹ See Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass, III: 1929-1935*, ed. Iso Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 203.

¹⁰ On this issue in general, see Wilfred Sellars, especially his distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image, in his "Philosophy in the Scientific Image of Man," *Science, Perception and Reality* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 1-40.

¹¹ On these and related questions, see Anna Bergqvist and Robert Cowan, ed., *Evaluative Perception* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

¹² Perverse self-love is of course the nature of the “earthly” city as described exhaustively by Augustine in *civ. dei*.

¹³ It should be noted that Augustine has been credited with anticipating the idea of the unconscious. See Michael Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des heiligen Augustinus* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1967), 269.

¹⁴ Augustine’s concern with self-knowledge is hardly confined to *De trinitate*. See, in particular, *Gen. litt.*, 7.21.28.

¹⁵ See *trin.*, 14.2.10 and 15.6.40. The notion is classical. See Sextus Empiricus, *adv. math.* 8.275-176.

¹⁶ See *trin.*, 9.2.15; the idea is prefigured in 8.4.9. For Augustine, early and late, thought is to be prized over language, as his remarks on the “inner ear,” discussed in the second chapter, suggest.

¹⁷ I emphasize that this is Augustine’s later view, which one finds in *trin.* For his earlier view, see in particular *dial.*, which draws heavily on Stoic semiotics, and his less affirmative view of language as given in *mag.*

¹⁸ See *trin.*, 15.3.19-20.

¹⁹ Augustine’s evocation of the memory in his *Confessiones* should be recalled here. See *conf.* 10.8.15 and 10.9.16.

²⁰ It is worth noting that the birth language favored by Augustine is appropriate to the word “concept,” which derives from the Latin *conceptum* (something that has been conceived).

Gottlob Frege thinks of concepts as abstract objects: see his “On Concept and Object” in Peter Geach and Max Black, *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Oxford: Basil

Blackwell, 1960). Thomas Hobbes is an early proponent of the theory of concepts as mental representations: see *Leviathan*, ed. Marshall Missner (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), 1.5.

²¹ See *Jo. Ev. tr.*, 37.4. On the issue of abstraction, see Ronald H. Nash, *The Light of the Mind: St Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1969), 96.

²² See, for example, Jacques Derrida's strictures on "the voice that keeps silence" in his *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, trans. and intro. David B. Allison, pref. Newton Garver (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), ch. 6. At the same time, it should be noted that Augustine's doctrine of the *verbum interius* has a modern defender of considerable authority in Hans-Georg Gadamer who sees in it a ground for the universality of hermeneutics. See his *Truth and Method*, trans. ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), 378-97. The latter is the subject of a sizable study by John Arthos, *The Inner Word in Gadamer's Hermeneutics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009).

²³ Most likely, Augustine gleaned these popular ideas from Cicero. But it should be noted that, strictly considered, the Stoics did not offer a materialist account of the mind; rather, they thought of the mind as the active part of the body (and so not distinct from the body) while the passive part is its material structure. For Cicero's summary, see his *tusc.*, 1 9.19-10.19-22.

²⁴ Also see, in this regard, Augustine's comments on loving a man because he is just in *trin.*, 8.4.9.

²⁵ See *div. qu.*, 71.5.

²⁶ See *mor.*, 1.26.52.

²⁷ See, in particular, Brachtendorf, *Der Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, esp. ch. 6.

²⁸ See *conf.*, 10.20.29.

²⁹ See *trin.*, 15.6.40.

³⁰ Augustine was clearly devoted to this argument. See his *Gen. litt.*, 7.21.28.

³¹ Cf. Augustine's far more well-known case that the "I" knows itself to exist in *civ. dei*, 11.26.

³² See Brachtendorf, *Der Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus*, esp. ch. 6.

³³ Wisse makes the point in his *Trinitarian Theology beyond Participation*, 160-63, and convicts Brachtendorf of finding Fichte in Augustine when, in his reading of 10.2.5-7, he stresses the priority of *se nosse* over *se cogitare*. In his later "Augustine on Self-Knowledge" Brachtendorf makes it plain that, for him, the foundational *imago dei* is that "of *memoria sui, intelligentia sui, and voluntas sui*" and maintains this position "since *se nosse* is prior to *se cogitare*," Renz, ed., *Self-Knowledge*, 110. His claim is therefore that the *imago dei* abides within the act of *se nosse* and not that the argument for the persistence of the "I" is itself the *imago dei*.

³⁴ See Cicero, *tusc.*, 1.9.19-10.19-22.

³⁵ For a particularly clear account of the distinction, see Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind*, ch. 3. Also see, in a briefer compass, Brachtendorf, "Augustine on Self-Knowledge and Human Subjectivity," 105-8.

³⁶ See Brachtendorf, "Augustine on Self-Knowledge," 110.

³⁷ *doc. Chr.*, 1.31.34.

³⁸ I refer the reader to James Wetzel, "Augustine on the Will," *A Companion to Augustine*, ed. Mark Vessey with the assistance of Shelley Reid (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 339-52.

³⁹ See Wisse, *Trinitarian Theology beyond Participation*, 161. Wisse allows himself to be distracted, it seems to me, by Brachtendorf's early interest in Fichte. See Brachtendorf, *Fichtes Lehre vom Sein. Eine kritische Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehren von 1794, 1798/99 und 1812* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1995).

⁴⁰ For an extended discussion of bedazzlement as an effect of the saturation of quality, see Jean-Luc Marion, *Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness*, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 202-6. Also see Marion's study of Augustine's *Confessiones*:

In the Self's Place: The Approach of Saint Augustine, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).

⁴¹ The twisting of desires is a corruption of the will, which precedes the act of disobedience. See *civ. dei*, 14.13. Augustine also entertains the idea that the first sin was caused by haste. See *Gen. litt.*, 11.41.56.

⁴² On the distinction between *frui* and *uti*, see *doc. Chr.*, 1.4. The distinction was in wide use in Roman law.

⁴³ Elsewhere, Augustine proposes that idolatry is a divine punishment. Human beings “set their hearts on the works more than on the craftsman or the craft itself” and are accordingly punished by God. They “are hunting for the craftsman and the craft in the works, and when they have not been able to find them. . . they conclude that the works themselves are both craft and craftsman,” *vera relig.*, 36.67.

⁴⁴ See the discussion of *pondus* at *conf.*, 13.9.10. Augustine maintains that Adam’s sin is compounded of several sins: pride, sacrilege, murder, and spiritual fornication. See *ench.*, 45.

⁴⁵ *trin.*, 13.3.12. Also see 13.5.23. *doc. Chr.*, 3.19.28 shows Augustine fulminating against sexual excess.

⁴⁶ See *vera rel.*, 13.26.

⁴⁷ On the felicity of life in the Garden of Eden, see *civ. dei*, 14.10.

⁴⁸ See *doc. Chr.*, 1.38.

⁴⁹ See *Gen. litt.*, 18.37.

⁵⁰ Also see *Jo. Ev. tr.*, 18.10.

⁵¹ I differ, then, from Brachtendorf for whom the draft of the *imago dei* in book ten yields the original image of God in which we have been made and over which is grafted a second image, which is the true *imago dei*.

⁵² See *en. Ps.*, 129.1 and 45.14.

⁵³ See Augustine, *Gen. litt.*, 6.5-18. I follow the dates proposed by Edmund Hill in *On Genesis*, 164. It is worthwhile remembering that Augustine affirms the power of recollection and rejects the Platonic doctrine of transmigration of souls. See *trin.*, 12.4.24.

⁵⁴ On the divine light, see *c. Faust.*, 20.7 and *ep.*, 120.10.

⁵⁵ I emphasize *two main camps*, for these positions do not exhaust the interpretation of the doctrine of illumination. There are stout defenders of the “formal theory,” for example, although I will not engage them here. See Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, 2.1: *Augustine to Bonaventure* (New York: Image Books, 1962), and Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, 1.5.2.

⁵⁶ On this theme, see Erik L. Saak, “Augustine in the Western Middle Ages to the Reformation,” in Vessey, *A Companion to Augustine*, 465-77.

⁵⁷ *Gen. litt.*, 3.20.30.

⁵⁸ See *trin.*, 15.3.14.

⁵⁹ See Peter Kwasniewski *et al.*, trans., *On Love and Charity: Readings from the “Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard”* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012). Also see Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994) and Philipp Rosemann, “*Fraterna dilectio est Deus*: Peter Lombard’s Thesis on Charity as the Holy Spirit,” in *Amor amicitiae – On the Love that is Friendship: Essays in Medieval Thought and Beyond in Honor of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy*, ed. Thomas A. F. Kelly and Philipp W. Rosemann, *Recherches de philosophie et théologie médiévales*, Bibliotheca 6 (Louvain: Peeters, 2004), 409-36.

⁶⁰ See Aquinas, *ST*, 2a2æ q. 23 art. 2 ad 1. Aquinas cites in the *sed contra* Augustine’s definition of love as movement of the soul, as given in *doc. Chr.*, 3.10, his point being that if love is a motion it cannot be God, who is unmoved. Also, Aquinas argues that participation in love (as in

goodness and wisdom) does not result in one's being love, no more so that participating in goodness makes one goodness or participating in wisdom makes one wisdom itself. For an account of Aquinas's earlier views of Lombard's distinction 1.17, see Dominic Doyle, "Is Charity the Holy Spirit? The Development of Aquinas's Disagreement with Peter Lombard," in *Aquinas, Questions on Love and Charity: Summa theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Questions 23-46*, ed., trans. and intro. Robert Miner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 313-25.

⁶¹ See, for example, Matt. 9:36, 14:14, 15:32. In the Gospel only the Good Samaritan and the Father of the Prodigal Son show compassion and act upon it.

⁶² Lev. 19: 18 states *veahavta l'reyacha kamocho*, which means to help one's fellow Jew. On no account, however, could this be taken to imply that one is not to love others, including non-Jews. To do so would be to run against the entire spirit of Torah. I take Luke's Jesus to make the point that one must look beyond Lev. 19: 18 to the whole of Torah in order to understand the true meaning of love, and this involves a radical rethinking of neighbor love. That a Samaritan, a member of a despised community on religious grounds, could be a model of neighborly love, is clearly shocking to the lawyer who cannot even bring himself to say, "the Samaritan" but only "the one who showed mercy."

⁶³ Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of "The Metaphysics of Morals,"* in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed., Mary J. Gregor, gen. intro. Allen Wood, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 80.

⁶⁴ On the motif of tragedy with respect to Augustine, see Tracy, "Augustine, Our Contemporary: The Overdetermined, Incomprehensible Self," *Filaments*, 2, 19-66.